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Abstract
This paper revisits the Alexia value, a recent solution concept for cooper-
ative transferable utility games. We introduce the dual Alexia value and
show that it coincides with the Alexia value for several classes of games.
We demonstrate the importance of the notion of compromise stability for
characterizing the Alexia value.
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11 Introduction
There are several ways to provide one allocation as a solution for broad classes of
transferable utility (TU) games: the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) for general
TU-games, the compromise value (Tijs (1981)) for compromise admissible TU-
games and the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) for TU-games which allow for
eﬃcient and individually rational allocations. For all games with a non-empty
core the nucleolus provides a core-element as a solution. For the Shapley value
and the compromise value this does not hold in general.
A recent one-point solution concept for games with a non-empty core is the
Alexia value, introduced by Tijs (2005). The Alexia value is deﬁned as the
average of all so-called ‘lexinals’. Here, a lexinal is deﬁned as the lexicograph-
ical maximum of the core, with respect to an arbitrary order on the players.
In a lexinal, the amount allocated to a player is the maximum he can obtain
within the core, under the restriction that the players before him in the corre-
sponding order recursively obtain their restricted maximum. As an alternative
we introduce the dual Alexia value which is deﬁned as the average over the
lexicographical minima of the core.
An important notion with respect to identifying the Alexia value turns out
to be compromise stability. A game is called compromise stable if it has a non-
empty core, and the core coincides with the core cover (Quant, Borm, Reijnierse,
and Van Velzen (2005)). First of all it is established that for compromise stable
games, the Alexia value and the dual Alexia value coincide. Secondly, we show
that the Alexia value of a compromise stable game coincides with the com-
promise extension of the run-to-the-bank rule (O’Neill (1982)) for bankruptcy
situations as introduced by Quant, Borm, Hendrickx, and Zwikker (2006). This
generalizes one of the main theorems of Tijs (2005). Finally we show that for
the class of strongly compromise admissible games ´ a la Driessen (1988), which
form a speciﬁc subclass of compromise stable games, the Alexia value and the
nucleolus coincide.
The outline of this paper is as follows: section two recalls the deﬁnition of
the Alexia value, introduces the dual Alexia value and establishes connections.
An application on simple ﬂow games is provided. Section three investigates the
Alexia value for compromise stable games.
2 The Alexia value
A transferable utility game (N,v) is deﬁned by a ﬁnite player set N and a
function v on the set 2N of all subsets of N assigning to each coalition S ∈ 2N
a value v(S), such that v(∅) = 0. The core (Gillies (1953)) is deﬁned as the set
of those allocations of v(N), for which no coalition has an incentive to split oﬀ:
C(v) =
 






xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N
 
.
2A game is called balanced if its core is non-empty.
The Alexia value was introduced as a one point solution concept for balanced
games by Tijs (2005). Where the Shapley value is the average over marginal
vectors, the Alexia value can be found by averaging over the lexicographic max-
ima of the core with respect to all possible orders on the players. An order
σ is a bijective function σ : {1,...,|N|} → N. The class of all orders of N is
denoted with Π(N). Let σ ∈ Π(N). With σ(k) we denote the player at po-
sition k ∈ {1,...,|N|} in the order σ. For a balanced game (N,v), the lexinal





xσ(k) | x ∈ C(v), λ
σ
σ(l)(v) = xσ(l) for all l ∈ {1,..,k − 1}
 
,
for all k ∈ {1,...,|N|}. The lexinal is recursively deﬁned such that every player
gets the maximum he can obtain inside the core under the restriction that the
players before him in the corresponding order obtain their restricted maxima.









It is readily veriﬁed that the Alexia value satisﬁes the basic properties of relative
invariance with respect to strategic equivalence and symmetry. The following
example demonstrates the Alexia value on the class of simple ﬂow games, as








Figure 1: A simple ﬂow network
Example 2.1. In the simple ﬂow network of Figure 1, all edges have capacity
1 and are undirected. The players want to generate a ﬂow from the source So
to the sink Si. The number next to an edge denotes the player that owns the
edge: e.g. player 3 owns the edge {So,A}. The player set is N = {1,...,5}. For
every coalition S ⊆ N it can be computed how much they can transport from the
3source to the sink without using edges owned by players outside the coalition.
This leads to the value vf(S) of the coalition in the ﬂow game vf corresponding
with the simple ﬂow network. One readily checks that the core of this game





The result of Example 2.1 can be generalized. By Reijnierse et al. (1996), the
extreme points of the core coincide with the so-called minimum cut vectors.
A minimum cut is a coalition that owns a set of edges with minimal total
capacity, of which at least one is needed to generate a positive ﬂow from source
to sink. A minimum cut vector is the indicator vector of a minimum cut. As
every minimum cut vector consists of the same number of ones and zeros, every
minimum cut vector occurs the same number of times as lexinal. Therefore, the
Alexia value equals the average over all minimal cut vectors.
Proposition 2.1. Let vf be a simple ﬂow game. Then the Alexia value of vf
equals the average over the minimal cut vectors.
The deﬁnition of the Alexia value allows for a natural modiﬁcation. For a
balanced game (N,v), we deﬁne the dual Alexia value α(v) as the average over









where for all σ ∈ Π(N) the dual lexinal λ
σ





xσ(k) | x ∈ C(v), λ
σ
σ(l)(v) = xσ(l) for all l ∈ {1,...,k − 1}
 
,
for all k ∈ {1,...,|N|}.
It turns out that for several classes of games the Alexia value and the dual
Alexia value coincide. We start with the class of compromise stable games.
Compromise stability uses the notion of the core cover, as introduced by Tijs
and Lipperts (1982). The core cover is given by:
CC(v) =
 
x ∈ RN |
 
i∈N















for all i ∈ N.
4A game is called compromise admissible if the core cover is non-empty. For a
compromise admissible game (N,v) a characterization of the core cover involves
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for all k ∈ {1,...,|N|}.
For each compromise admissible game (N,v) the core cover coincides with the
convex hull of all larginal vectors:
CC(v) = Conv{ℓσ(v) | σ ∈ Π(N)}.
A compromise admissible game (N,v) is called compromise stable if the
core cover equals the core. For compromise stable games, the dual Alexia value
coincides with the Alexia value.
Theorem 2.1. If (N,v) is compromise stable, then α(v) = α(v).
Proof. Let (N,v) be compromise stable. Then
C(v) = CC(v) and CC(v)  = ∅.






xσ(k) | x ∈ C(v), λ
σ




xσ(k) | x ∈ C(v), xσ(l) = ℓσ



















which concludes the proof.
For σ ∈ Π(N), the vector mσ(v) ∈ RN of marginal contributions with respect
to σ is deﬁned by
5mσ
σ(k)(v) = v({σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(k)}) − v({σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(k − 1)}),
for every k ∈ {1,...,|N|}. The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) is deﬁned as the








while the Weber set (Weber (1988)) is the convex hull of all marginal vectors:
W(v) = Conv{mσ(v) | σ ∈ Π(N)}.
A game is called convex if the core and the Weber set coincide (cf Shapley
(1971) and Ichiishi (1981)).
Theorem 2.2. Let (N,v) be convex. Then
(i) α(v) = Φ(v) (Tijs (2005)),
(ii) α(v) = α(v).
Proof of (ii). Let σ ∈ Π(N). By induction on the position k ∈ {1,...,|N|}, we
prove that λ
σ














Now consider k ∈ {2,...,|N|} and, assume that λ
σ
σ(l)(v) = mσ
σ(l)(v) for l ∈









σ(l)(v) = v({σ(1),...,σ(k − 1)}).
Let S = {σ(1),...,σ(k)}. By deﬁnition of the core, min
  





σ(k)(v) ≥ v(S)−v(S\{σ(k)}) = mσ
σ(k). However, by convexity













σ(v) = Φ(v) = α(v).
The last equality follows from part (i).
63 Alexia and bankruptcy
A bankruptcy situation is deﬁned as a pair (E,d), where E ∈ R+ is the es-
tate which has to be divided among a set of players N. The claim vector
is denoted by d ∈ RN, where di ≥ 0 represents the claim of player i ∈ N.
It is assumed that E ≤
 
i∈N di. With a bankruptcy situation one can as-
sociate a bankruptcy game (N,vE,d), where the value of a coalition equals







for all S ⊆ N. It is well known that every
bankruptcy game is convex and compromise stable.
O’Neill (1982) introduces the run-to-the-bank (RTB) rule to divide the estate























The interpretation of the rσ
σ(k) is as follows: the players arrive at the bank in
the order σ. Upon arrival, a player receives his total claim or, if there is not
enough money left to satisfy his claim, the maximum amount that is available.
Importantly, for every bankruptcy situation (E,d) it holds that RTB(E,d) =
Φ(vE,d).
The compromise extension RTB* of the RTB-rule to the class of all compromise
admissible games is introduced by Quant et al. (2006) and is given by








for each compromise admissible game (N,v).







A balanced game (N,v) is called exact (Schmeidler (1972)) if for every coalition
S ⊆ N there exists an element x ∈ C(v) such that
 
i∈S xi = v(S). The
exactiﬁcation of an arbitrary game is the smallest exact game with the same





xi | x ∈ C(v)
 
7for each S ⊆ N.
Since two and three person balanced games are compromise stable, as well
as simplex and dual simplex games, the following theorem is a generalization of
Theorem 3.1 of Tijs (2005).
Theorem 3.2. Let (N,v) be compromise stable. Then
(i) (N,vE) is strategically equivalent1 to a bankruptcy game.
(ii) α(v) = Φ(vE) = RTB∗(v).
Proof.














i∈S mi(v) < v(N).













since vE = w + m(v). Note that (N,w) is the bankruptcy game correspond-
ing to the bankruptcy problem (E,d) with E = v(N) −
 
i∈N mi(v) and di =
Mi(v) − mi(v) for all i ∈ N.
(ii) Because (N,vE) is strategically equivalent to a bankruptcy game, (N,vE)
is convex and compromise stable. Since C(v) = C(vE), we have α(v) = α(vE).
So, with E = v(N) −
 
i∈N mi(v) and di = Mi(v) − mi(v) for all i ∈ N, the
proof of (i) implies




= m(v) + Φ(vE,d)




where the last equality holds by Theorem 2.2.
The compromise value τ(v) for a compromise admissible game (N,v) is given
by
τ(v) = γ   M(v) + (1 − γ)   m(v),
1Two games (N,v) and (N,w) are strategically equivalent if there exist an additive game
a and k ∈ R++ such that w = k · v + a.
8where γ ∈ [0,1] is uniquely determined by
 
i∈N τi(v) = v(N).
A compromise admissible game (N,v) is called strongly compromise admissible
(Driessen (1988)) if for all S ⊆ N,S  = ∅ it holds that:
 
j∈N
Mj(v) − v(N) ≤
 
j∈S
Mj(v) − v(S). (1)
From Theorem 3.1 of Quant et al. (2005) it follows that every strongly compro-
mise admissible game is compromise stable.
Theorem 3.3. If (N,v) is strongly compromise admissible, then
(i) C(v) = Conv
 
{M(v)   eN\{i} + m(v)   e{i}}i∈N
 2
,
(ii) τ(v) =3 1
|N|[(|N| − 1)   M(v) + m(v)].














Mσ(k) if k ∈ {1,...,|N| − 1}
mσ(k) if k = |N|.
As (N,v) is compromise stable,
C(v) = CC(v),
= Conv({ℓσ(v) | σ ∈ Π(N)}),
= Conv
 
{M(v)   e




which completes the proof.
Proof of (ii). Let (N,v) be strongly compromise admissible. By the proof
of (i),  
j∈N\{i}
Mj(v) + mi(v) = v(N),














j∈N Mj(v) + (1 − γ)  
 




[(|N| − 1)   M(v) + m(v)],
which proves part (ii).
2eS denotes the indicator vector for coalition S ⊆ N: eS
i = 1 if i ∈ S, eS
i = 0 if i ∈ N\S.
3By Driessen (1988) the τ-value equals the nucleolus for strongly compromise admissible
games.
9For strongly compromise admissible games, the Alexia value coincides with
the compromise value.
Theorem 3.4. If (N,v) is strongly compromise admissible, then α(v) = τ(v).
Proof. Let (N,v) be strongly compromise admissible. By part (i) of Theorem
3.3, C(v) = Conv
 
{M(v)   eN\{i} + m(v)   e{i}}i∈N
 
. Let σ ∈ Π(N). Then
λσ
σ(k)(v) = Mσ(k)(v) for all k < |N|, and λσ




σ∈Π(N) λσ(v) = 1
|N|!(|N|!−(|N|−1)!) M(v)+(|N|−1)! m(v)] =
τ(v), where the last equality follows from Theorem 3.3.
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